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Modeling the Public Health System Response to a 
Terrorist Event 
Donald W. Schaffner* 
INTRODUCTION 
When seeking to model the response of the public health 
system to a terrorist attack on the food supply, it is logical to 
use the tools of risk analysis.  The field of risk analysis is 
commonly divided into three separate but overlapping areas: 
risk assessment, which seeks to address the magnitude of the 
risk under consideration and the factors that raise or lower the 
risk; risk communication, which addresses the tools and 
techniques needed to talk about the risk in question with 
affected individuals (e.g. the general public, the food industry, 
regulatory agents, etc.); and finally risk management, which 
determines what can be done about the particular risk in 
question and which course of action is generally best, 
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considering the needs of all affected individuals.1 
The objective of the Public Health Response Modeling 
research group is to develop a mathematical model that 
describes the behavior of the public health system in response 
to a contamination event.2  Ideally, the model we develop 
should also be able to predict the effect of interventions (e.g., 
food recalls or advisory messages).  Although our model is being 
developed to specifically address deliberate contamination of 
the food supply, it may also be useful for accidental 
contamination, such as in the recent Escherichia coli O157:H7 
contamination of bagged spinach.3  This mathematical model 
will be a useful tool for policymakers seeking to understand the 
importance of various factors governing the response of the 
public health system to the microbial contamination of the food 
supply. 
CURRENT MODEL DETAILS 
The current version of the mathematical model was 
created using the risk modeling program Analytica® (Lumina 
Decision Systems, Los Gatos, CA).4  The model predicts a 
scenario that unfolds over fifty days, consisting of sixty “dose-
events” (i.e. contaminated servings of food).  When a 
contaminated serving is consumed, the simulated victim has a 
single probability of becoming ill, and that illness may be one of 
three severity levels determined randomly by the model.  
Figure 1 shows a series of screenshots from the model.  Panel A 
represents the overall structure of the model showing the five 
modules that compose the complete model.  Each of these 
module nodes is depicted as a rounded rectangle with a thick 
border.  This thick border indicates that each of these nodes 
contain additional levels of detail.  The arrows connecting the 
nodes indicate that information from one node is being used to 
calculate values in another node.   
 1. See generally Thomas E. McKone, Overview of the Risk Analysis 
Approach and Terminology: The Merging of Science, Judgment and Values, 7 
FOOD CONTROL 69 (1996). 
 2. A contamination event would be an event where pathogenic microbes 
were allowed to contaminate a food product, either through an accident, or 
through deliberate introduction by a terrorist. 
 3. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Spinach and E. coli 
Outbreak, http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/spinach.html (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2007). 
 4. Lumina Decision Systems, What is Analytica?, 
http://www.lumina.com/ana/whatisanalytica.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
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FIGURE 1: SCREEN SNAP SHOTS SHOWING FOUR DIFFERENT AREAS OF 
THE ANALYTICAL® MODEL 
 
 
 
A.  Overall Model B.  Public Health Response 
For example, information from the Dose-Response node and the 
Medical Attention nodes are used in calculations in the Cluster 
Detection node.  Panel B shows the details of the Public Health 
Response part of the model, while Panels C and D show details 
of the Medical Attention and Cluster Detection parts of the 
model respectively.  As noted for Panel A, the arrows represent 
mathematical links between the different values, so in Panel C, 
“Lag in Seeking Medical Attention” and “Seeks Medical 
Attention if Ill” are both used to calculate the value of “Day 
Medical Attention Sought”.  In some cases arrowheads without 
connecting lines are shown.  These represent inputs or outputs 
to or from other nodes outside the current module used for 
calculations.  For example, in Panel C, “Day Medical Attention 
Sought” plus another node, outside the “Medical Attention” 
module to calculate the value of “Case Examined”.  
D.  Cluster Detection C.  Medical Attention
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Furthermore, the value of “Case Examined” is used to calculate 
“Total Cases Examined to Date” as well as another node 
outside the “Medical Attention” module.  In Panels B-D the 
trapezoid shapes indicate that these variables are constants 
that are set by the user prior to running the simulation.  The 
oval shapes are “chance” nodes that take on a different random 
value for each iteration of the simulation, while the rounded 
rectangles with thin borders represent “general” variables.  
These are intermediate variables, whose values are not set by 
the user and may or may not be probabilistic.  The other 
features (nodes, modules, arrows, shapes, etc.) allow the user of 
the software to navigate through the model and see explicitly 
how different calculations are made. 
The simulation uses a “detection constant” to determine 
whether the public health system has or has not detected that 
an outbreak occurred.  The equation that determines the 
probability of outbreak detection is: 
 twcdep ∗−=1 
 
 
Although it is not yet implanted in the current version of 
the simulation, ideally the detection constant would be related 
to the specificity of symptoms experienced by the victims.  In 
other words, some pathogens have a unique set of symptoms 
(e.g., Clostridium botulinum with symptoms of weakness and 
vertigo, followed by double vision and difficulty in speaking and 
Where “p” is the probability of detection, “e” is the base of 
the natural logarithm (2.71828...), “d” is the chosen value of the 
detection constant, and “twc” is the total number of (weighted) 
cases experienced to date in the simulation.  The cases are 
weighted by severity of the illness; mild cases are weighted less 
than moderate cases, which are weighted less than the most 
severe cases.  A detailed example showing the effect of different 
cases severities is provided in the results section below, but 
when the detection constant is low (e.g. 0.1) and the total 
weight cases is also low (e.g. 0.2, a small number ill, with mild 
symptoms), then the probability of detection would be one 
minus “e” raised to the power of -0.1 time 0.2 or about 0.02, or a 
one-in-fifty chance of detecting the outbreak.  On the other 
hand, with a high detection constant (e.g. 1) and the total 
weighted cases is high (i.e. 1, meaning one very sick person), 
the probability of detecting the outbreak rises to more than 
50%. 
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swallowing5) very different from typical food borne disease 
symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea.  These unique symptoms 
make it easier to detect outbreaks of certain types of food borne 
disease over others.  Incorporating a measure of the specificity 
of symptoms in the detection constant should improve the 
accuracy of the model, so that for example, an outbreak which 
consists of ten cases of botulism is much more easily detected 
than an outbreak with ten cases of mild diarrhea caused by 
Salmonella. 
RESULTS 
Graph 1 shows the relationship between the probability of 
detection over time and a mixture of illness profiles for three 
different situations: all mild illnesses, all serious illnesses and 
the baseline scenario with a mixture of illnesses (60% mild 
illness, 30% moderate illness and 10% severe illness). 
 
GRAPH 1. THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION FOR A MIXTURE 
OF ILLNESS PROFILES 
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In the baseline scenario the maximum probability of detecting 
the outbreak occurred at day ten, with a probability of about 
16%.  It should be noted that because the detection probability 
 5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food borne Pathogenic 
Microorganisms and Natural Toxins Handbook, 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~mow/chap2.html (Jan. 1992 with periodic updates). 
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is evaluated each day, the probability that the illness will not 
be detected becomes smaller and smaller over time.  As 
expected, in those situations in which the mix of illness severity 
becomes more serious, the probability of detection rises more 
rapidly.  When all of the illnesses are serious, the probability 
that the outbreak will be detected peaks after eight days, 
instead of ten.  When the illnesses are all mild, the detection 
probability peaks after thirteen days.  It is interesting, 
however, that even in the most severe situation, it still takes 
eight days for the probability of detection to reach its peak and 
probabilities of detection are always quite low at the beginning 
of an outbreak.  This length of time is attributable to the 
number of delays inherent in the system, such as: the 
incubation period in each person, delays in seeking medical 
attention once the illness manifests, and delays in transmission 
of the medical information to public health officials. 
Graph 2 shows the relationship between probability of 
detection over time and the value of the outbreak detection 
constant “d” noted in the equation above.  The figure compares 
three different values for the detection constant: a baseline 
value (-0.5) representing on average ten cases needed to detect 
an outbreak a sensitive value (-5) representing on average only 
a single case needed to detect an outbreak, and an insensitive 
value (-0.05) representing on average one hundred cases 
needed to detect an outbreak. 
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GRAPH 2. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION FOR VARIOUS 
VALUES OF THE OUTBREAK DETECTION CONSTANT 
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While making the model more sensitive to the detection of 
an outbreak, an average of one out of ten cases needed to 
trigger detection might be expected to significantly raise the 
probability of outbreak detection; the simulation results 
indicate that this may not be the case.  As noted in the 
discussion of Graph 1 above, the delays inherent in the system 
prevent immediate detection, regardless of sensitivity to cases.  
Likewise, raising the number of cases needed to trigger 
detection has only a very slight effect on the day at which the 
probability of detection is at a maximum.  This is likely because 
the number of simulated doses (in this case sixty) still result in 
a significant “signal” reaching the public health system.  As 
noted above, even if the probability of detection on any given 
day is low, the chance of repeatedly failing to detect an 
outbreak falls dramatically the longer the outbreak goes on. 
These results show that even with a simple model, the 
simulation has the important ability to assist in reasoning 
through the implications and consequences of our assumptions 
about how the public health system might be expected to 
behave.  We do, however, acknowledge that this model is still a 
preliminary one and needs a significant number of refinements 
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before it matches what most public health officials would 
consider the real world.  The remainder of this paper will focus 
on enhancements to the model that are planned for the near 
future. 
IMPROVEMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The model described above includes many assumptions 
about the public health system that can be refined through the 
addition of more realistic public health data.  Two different 
approaches are being used at this time: (1) expert elicitation, 
which uses expert opinion (from carefully designed 
questionnaires) to fill in needed gaps in the assumptions used 
in the simulation, and (2) the addition of real public health 
data.  In the latter case, few data are available, but one notable 
exception is the Enteric Disease Investigation Timeline Study 
(EDITS).6  A brief summary of the EDITS data is shown in 
Table 1. 
TABLE 1. EDITS DATA SUMMARY7 
 Salmonella Shigella Campy E. coli Listeria 
Onset of Illness 328 162 145 163 31 
Specimen Collection 
Date 
479 194 174 175 36 
Initial Report Date 258 99 117 55 19 
State Report Date 196 94 96 32 13 
Isolate Submission 
Date 
441 165 91 160 24 
PFGE Set Up Date 117 35 0 79 0 
PFGE Sub-typing 
Date 
351 114 0 147 19 
Interview Date 225 98 105 154 21 
      
Total observations 537 253 251 188 45 
Complete records, all 
dates 
3 0 0 8 0 
 
 
The database contains information on five pathogens: 
Salmonella, Shigella, Campylobacter, Escherichia coli O157:H7 
                                                          
 6. See generally CRAIG HEDBERG, COUNCIL OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGISTS, THE ENTERIC DISEASE TIMELINE STUDY (2005), available at 
http://www.cste.org/pdffiles/2005/EDITS-final-report.pdf. 
 7. Id. 
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and Listeria monocytogenes.  For each of these five pathogens, 
the database contains information from real-world cases in six 
states.  That real-world data contains: 
• The date of illness onset; 
• The date a fecal specimen was collected; 
• The date an initial report was filed; 
• The date a report with the state health department 
was filed; 
• The date a fecal sample isolate was submitted to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
for entry into PulseNet;8 
• The date that genetic fingerprinting, called Pulsed 
Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE), was set up by the 
CDC, the date the genetic fingerprinting was 
complete; and 
• The date the affected individual was interviewed by 
state or local epidemiologists. 
Although this database is state of the art and quite extensive, 
it should be noted that because it contains real-world data, it is 
by its very nature incomplete, and although it contains over 
one thousand records, only three records are fully complete and 
contain information on all eight types of data. 
Graph 3 shows three representative examples of frequency 
distributions for three different steps in the timeline for a 
salmonellosis outbreak investigation from the enteric disease 
timeline study database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, PulseNet, 
http://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
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GRAPH 3.  REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPLES OF FREQUENCY 
DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THREE DIFFERENT STEPS IN A 
SAMONELLOSIS OUTBREAK TIMELINE 
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It is clear from the data shown in the top panel that, in the 
case of Salmonella, the time from obtaining a specimen until an 
organism is isolated follows an essentially normal distribution, 
with an average of about one week.  In almost no cases does it 
take longer than two weeks to obtain an isolate.  The time from 
when this isolate is obtained until it is sub-typed is more 
variable, as shown in the middle panel.  In this case the sub-
typing is most commonly completed within three days, but the 
average time to completion was closer to two weeks, with some 
samples not typed until three or more weeks after isolation.  
Finally, the bottom panel shows that the time from disease 
onset until the patient is interviewed is highly variable, with 
an average time to interview of about eighteen days, but with 
some interviews taking place after two days, and others not 
completed until three or four weeks after disease onset. 
The analysis depicted in Graph 3 can be repeated for the 
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other organisms in the EDITS database and for the timelines 
described in Table 1. Although not presented here, EDITS 
found that E coli O157:H7 cases are reported one to three days 
sooner that Salmonella cases,9 consistent with the predictions 
of the model, based on severity of illness. The EDITS study also 
predicted the timelines observed in the reporting of cases 
associated with the recent spinach outbreak. Thus, this real 
world dataset can, with careful review and analysis, become 
part of the data used to enhance the current simulation model. 
OTHER IMPROVEMENTS 
As noted above, the model does not currently distinguish 
between pathogens with a unique signature (like C. botulinum) 
and others that present as more classical food borne pathogens 
(like Salmonella).  The addition of a pathogen signature 
variable to flag distinct pathogens easily would be an important 
enhancement to the model. 
Another important aspect of the public health system, 
which is not currently considered in the model, is the ability of 
the hospitals and other health care providers to react to 
epidemics.  One member of our team works for a large 
Minnesota hospital, and her objective in the coming year is to 
add data on the hospital system capacity to the model.  This 
enhancement will allow us to consider the mitigating effects of 
various interventions on public health, such as ventilator 
capacity or anti-toxin availability in the case of a C. botulinum 
outbreak. 
A third enhancement to the model that we envision over 
the next year will be the addition of time dependent feedback 
on the model predictions, so that as a simulated event unfolds 
on the computers, the effect of various interventions (i.e. recalls 
or announcements from public health officials) can be 
considered.  We also hope to further model the effect of various 
messaging strategies through data provided via collaboration 
with risk communication researchers at the National Center for 
Food Protection and Defense. 
SUMMARY 
The model presented here is still a work in progress and 
we still require more realistic public health data, more 
pathogen specific data, and the ability to model the mitigating 
effect of intervention, but in the end we hope that our finished 
 9. HEDBERG, supra note 6, at 3. 
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product will be useful in optimizing the performance of the 
public health system. 
Through the data presented here we hope to have 
illustrated that mathematical modeling can be a useful tool in 
solving public health problems because is helps to pinpoint 
uncertainties or knowledge gaps, while at the same time 
serving as a tool for investigating the impact of potential 
changes to the system. 
